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L. Metrology
The last two Chapters represent a style of inquiry which its admirers
would describe as soaring and to which its detractors would confer the
w
B.S. degree. It is time for a shift in style to the more precise and
explicit, although, as we shall see, it is impossible to keep the vague
and implicit out of the inquiring system.
The discussion of the Hegelian inquiring system ended with Hegel's
optimism, the promise that the iinvement from thesis-antithesis to synthesis
is a soaring to greater heights, to self awareness, more completeness,
betterment, progress. We now need to see if this optimism can be defended
s-.
and defined.
Our resource will be E. A. Singer, Jr., and specifically his
Experience and ,deflection. Singer chose as his starting point metrology,
a science which has been remarkably neglected by philosophers. Metrology
is the science of measurement. Nov philosophers have shown an interest
in the formal language of measurement (transitivity, asymmetry, etc.),
but language is only a part of the story. The really fascinating aspect
' 	1
of metrology from a philosophical point of view is the operational design
of measurement, i.e., the steps that must be performed to produce
measurements, and the justification that the produced readings accurately
describe some aspect of reality.
2. Standards and Units
T e	 inquiring system which measures, two initial decisionso design an inq i ng 	
	 ,
must be made: the unit and the standard. The unit appears'to be
l
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2"arbitrary," while the standard is not. As in all systems design, however,
the distinction between arbitrary and nonarbitrary is itself a nonarbitrary
strategic decision.
Suppose we use two examples to aid us in trying to design a measuring
system, one physical, the other social. I want to measure the width and
depth of an alcove wherein to place my desk so that I can measure my
ahi..lial net income for the IRS. I go in search of my measuring tape (which
is not where it's supposed to be, of course!), and with it in hand I
compare the boundaries of the alcove with the numbered marks on the tape,
and using a bit of st-Hple arithmetic, I write down some numbers on a slip
of paper. I've chosen to read these to the nearest quarter inch. Not
wishing to go through the bothersome business of returning the desk to
the furniture store because I miscalculated, I try two or three times
1
with different markers, or perhaps I ask my wife to measure as well.
With the desk in place, I sit and consult various records of income and
expenses, using the appropriate governmental forms, and finally arrive
at a net income figure expressed to the nearest dollar.
From these two homely examples, the shape of the measuring system
emerges. The set of components for the length system include at least
these: a rule-generating system, which specifies the steps to be followed,
a tape manufacturer, a visual system capable of following the specified
rules and thereby making comparisons and tr&:sforming these into numbers,
and a second visual system capable of checking the first. But what is
most relevant about the example is the very strong assumption that the
furniture store, which presumably measured the desk for me, has very much
the same system, so that their numbers and mine must agree, at least
within the quarter inch requirement. Indeed, the interesting point is
that there exists a system of measuring lengths, available to anyone who
i	 1
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3can acquire a ruler or tape, which is thoroughly reliable within, say,
an eighth or sixteenth of an inch. What is the design of such a measuring
system?
We can readily see that the basis of the design is a Lockean community.
It is interesting to note that the creation of such a community is no
simple social task. In the history of the USA, there was a time when an
inch was not an inch or a pound a pound. It took considerable legislation,
together with the formation of the Coast and Geodetic Survey and eventually
the National Bureau of Standards, to bring about sufficient agreement
among various sectors of the public. Even today, the numbers appearing
on food packages do not necessarily represent a relia:jle agreement.
The key to the design of the Lockean community for measurement is
the "standard." In the most general sense, 1 a standard consists of a set
of operations which in principle will resolve any disagreements arising
in the community. Imagine, for example, that I have purchased a five
pound bag of sugar, but on weighing it at home I find it to be only four
and a half pounds. I return to the store, where the manager weighs it
on his scale at five pounds. In principle, assuming a sufficient quantity
of patience, we could resolve our differences, say by going to the nearest
drugstore where finer weighing machines are available. But why would we
believe in this method of resolving the issue? Because ve might both be
confident that the druggist is honest, with no i stake in our quarrel, and
that he is constantly checking his balance against "standard" weights.
These weights themselves have been carefully prepared to conform to
lIf I were a general semanticist, I'd have to admit that the word
It
	 is used throughout in at least two senses, the more general
one referring to the operational design of the system, the more specific
to some property of an object, e.g., a platinum bar and'its markings. I
hope_ the ambiguity will not Bother anyone except a semanticist, because
the context should make it clear which meaning is being employed.
i
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national "standards." But here we seem to be on the verge of an infinite
regress. Suppose, to continue the example, that the druggist decides in
my favor, but the grocer, who is a man of principle even though an
Incredibly bad entrepreneur, wishes to check the druggist. Together we
go to the National Bureau of Standards, which weighs the bag in its
carefully controlled laboratory and reports a reading of 4.5238 lbs.
Where does the grocer go now if he's still convinced he's right? He
could, of course, go to an international body, but eventually the process
must stop. Thus the Lockean community is designed so that its members
agree, say, that the National Bureau is the ultimate check on any
disagreements. Does this mean that the Bureau sets arbitrary units and
operations? Of course not. It is the responsibility of the Bureau to
assure itself that there is a sound theoretical base for certifying that
a given method of measuring is, or is not, acceptable wherever it is
applied, and under whatever conditions. This is why the "unit" of length,
for example, is not arbitrary at all. One aspect of the Bureau's measure
of performance is the simplicity or cost of maintaining the system,
together with the degree of refinement of measurement the system produces.
The shift of the standard of length from a platinum bar immersed in a
liquid to the wave length of yellow cadmium was based on these considerations..
Here again, the emphasis in the literature on the formal aspects of
measurement has led to some linguistic confusions. Formally, it is true
that any unit of length can be chosen and shown to be proportional to any
other unit. But it does not follow that the unit of length is "arbitrary"
in the measurement system, any more than the dollar is arbitrary, if
"arbitrary" means that alternative choices are equally valuable from a
design point of view.
53. A Measure of Performance of the Measuring System
We can begin to see how a measure of performance, and hence of
progress, might now be defined. Assume that there is a positive value
of measuring length to a group of people, G. This group includes
housewives, carpenters, plumbers, manufacturers, scientists, surveyors,
etc. We might then say that the measure of performance of a measuring
system, M, is the degree to which M can design G into a Lockean community,
i.e., the degree to which differences about length among G's members can
be resolved by M.
But the lessons of the last few Chapters show us that creating a
Lockean community does not necessarily imply that knowledge will thereby
result. Why should we suppose that the com ynnnity of measurers is
describing reality? A number of responses can be made to this question,
as we shall see. At a very simple level, one could adopt .z pragmatic
position, as did John Dewey, and say that the measuring system measures
reality if the use of its data "works out satisfactorily." Thus the
measurement of the length of my desk accurately portrays reality if the
desk fits.
It is to be noted that this account has a very peculiar twist: the
measuring system is based on relatively precise rules and theories, while
its defense is based on the very imprecise concept of "works out." The
weakness of the philosophy is apparent enough. Most USA automobile
drivers mighthave agreed that the internal combustion engine has "`corked
out satisfactorily" until they learned of its contribution to air pollution.
But if one tries to go beyond Dewey to measure the real.utility of length
measurements, then there is another peculiar twist, for now the reality
of all measurements depends on the "fundamental" measurement of utility,
i.e., on a mea€•4rement process which, according to the criterion given
I
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above, has a very low measure of performance. To return to the illustration,
I sit at my well measured desk to measure my (real) income during the
past year. To be sure, there are rules to be followed and observations
to be made; furthermore, there will be a disinterested observer, an
auditor of the IRS, to check my obsev, ,LLions and obedience to the,rules.
But there is no Lockean community, because except in the simplest cases,
few would claim that the final number "measures" income. If "income"
means real value received over a period of time, then it is safe to say
that no one knows how to measure income even approximately. Thus the
proposed base for a satisfactory measure of length, namely, the real value
of the length measuring system, is itself in a dubious state of development.
And yet, despite the fact that we cannot even approximately state
I	 the worth of our global System of measuring length, it seems absurd to
say that there is a serious question about our ability to measure length.
Hence, some other criterion is needed to convince us that the Lockean
community of length measurers is describing reality rather than illusion.
And the criterion seems to be ready at hand once we accept: the wisdom of
examining the history of a system in considering its design. Two hundred
years ago the Lockean community could agree on a length measured within
one-thousand"h of an inch. Today, the accuracy can be within 100-millionth
of an inch. In and of itself this result is not impressive, of course,
because refinement alone is hardly the hallmark of reality; today's
realists scorn the scholastic ability to estimate the population of angels
within one or two angelic reads'. But it is worth noting horn refinement
does carry its own conviction provided agreements of certain kinds are
possible.
4. Readings and Replications
To return to the bag of sugar, if the grocer and I disagree on the
I-- 1
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first decimal point (e.g., 4.9 vs. 4.5), then the druggist may settle the
matter for us because his scales agree consistently to the third decimal
point. In general, when two measuring systems disagree in the nth decimal
point, their disagreement may be resolved by a third measuring system
1	 accurate to the ( n + 1)st or higher level. Of course, this principle
does not hold unless we have agreement in the community about certain
C	 aspects of the three systems. Our design task is to try to understand
1
these aspects.
The key design feature of the length measuring system is the abil i ty
to "replicate," i.e., to go through the same set of operations several
d
times. Suppose, following Singer, that we call an output of one set of
operations a "reading." Then the design specification seems to say that
	 1
the readings should be in "sufficient" agreement. It is reasonable to
argue that if they are not in agreement, then the system is not reliably
,1describing reality. The converse, of course, is not so obvious: if the
replicated readings agree, we canno" infer that the system is working
properly. To make this point clear, imagine one of the following four
conditions: (1) the object measured remains the same in length over the
period of time in which the replications occur, as does the measuring
rod; (2) the object fluctuates in length, while the measuring rod does
not; (3) the object remains the same, while the rod fluctuates; (4) both
fluctuate. Suppose, also, that the operational rules of the design system
are the simplest: compare the markings on the rod with the limits of the
object and, using arithmetic, report as a reading the differences. In
the first case we could assume that the readings would sufficiently agree
if the observers were careful. In the second and third, we would expect
trouble, because the replications would not produce agreements. But in
the fourth case, we might find agreement again, e.g., if the object and
,xy	 S^
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the rod were made out of the swAe temperature sensitive material in an
environment where the temperature is fluctuating. It is important to
notice that the four conditions are the framework of observation of
another system, the Hegelian over-observer. Our question of how the
system should behave in each of the four conditions is thus Hegelian in
kind: how can the over-observer be created?
Apparentl; , the simplest cases are the second and third, where the
measuring system is clearly out of phase with reality. One would expect
that a "competent" observer wou l d produce "inconsistent" readings when
he made "independent" observations. The descriptors "competent,"
"inconsistent," and "independent" are judgments of the over -observer, who
judges whether the operational steps have been carried out correctly, and
whether the observer ' s previous responses are influencing his present
observations. As system designers, we might be tempted to say that two
or more readings are inconsistent if they are not exactly alike. But
this would be a tactical error of design, the error of naive empiricism
which tries to base all inquiry on agreement. To be sure, provided the
observer is really competent and is really making independent observations,
then conditions 2 and 3 cannot hold if the readings are all alike within
the level of refinement of the readings. But an inquiring system faced
with an endless set of identical readings would never be able to determine
whether condition 1 or 4 holds, or whether 2 and 3 hold at a more refined
level of observation. The situation is a very familiar one in all
experimentatior. which permits replication of observation. The experimenter
wishes to test a hypothesis, and finds that his readings are in agreement
with his theory within a specified level of refinement. No amount of
additional testing with the same results would ever enable him to decide
whether another hypothesis,,also compatible with the data, is false, or.
n
whether his own would fail at a higher level of refinement.
5. Partitioning ( Refinement)
To Singer the taet-ical lesson seemed clear: whenever all readings
are identical, then the y inquiring system must shift to a higher level of
refinement. It should be emphasized at this point that any such tactical
decision of the inquiring system, like all tactical and strategic decisions
of any system, involves an ontological commitment. In the present case,
the inquiring system commits itself to the idea that every meaningful
descriptor of nr„ural obj ects :an be "partitioned.” We say that a
descriptor P is partitioned into descriptors P 1 , P29 "., Pn if the
following hold:
(1) If ''X is Pi " ( i = 1, 2 9 .... n) is judged to be true by the
inquiring system, then so is "X is P"; and
(2) If "X is P" is judged true, then either "X is P 1" or "X is P2"
or ..., or "X is P n " is judged true; and
(3) "X is Pi and X is Pi " (i # J) is never judged true; and
(4) n :;^ 2.
One interpretation of these stipulations merely says that a partitioning
is an exhaustive . and inclusive division of a set into at least two parts,
but this is a sprrlal case of more general conditions. The inquiring
system may use set theory as a basis of its j udgments, but it need not
do so. Often in the history of science the judgment has been based on
a Lockean community agreement (e.g., in physics that there are exactly
two kinds of particles, or in chemistry that there are n elements, or in
biology m species, etc.).
The ontological assumption of-partitioning is often expressed in
terms of "quantification," because the number system provides . a very
.^	 1
convenient way of satisfying the four stipulations. Indeed, the essence
10
of the "qualitative" is captured by the ontological assumption that
n.^.tture can be reduced to a set of descriptors which cannot be partitioned.
As we have seen, this assumption poses awkward, but not necessarily
insurmountable, problems for the inquiring system. This is a point which
we shall examine in the latter part of the book when we speculate about
the problems of inquiring systems. Although quantification permits a
very elegant way for the system to explore alternative explanations of
natural events, it may also exclude a whole aspect of nature, e.g., the
unique individual who cannot be pursued down the endless pathways of
S
iartitioning.
Singerian inquiring systems, then, are quantitative in the sense
specified above, so that the rule to partition whenever complete agreement
of readings occurs is assumed to be a meaningful rule in all cases
,although it may be extremely difficult to implement). The rule is
applied until the system reaches a level of refinement of its readings
where not all readings agree.
Now if the readings disagree at some level, e.g., in the third
decimal place, how should the inquiring system decide which of the four
cases specified on page 9 actually holds? The question is one of the
"analysis of variation," i.e., of deciding whether a variation or
disagreement is significant or not. All Singerian inquiring systems face
this problem, whether the inquiry is about lengths, or about the planning
of urban housing; or computing income taxes. In the case of length
measurements, the system may take advantage of the immense technolog y of
statistical "analysis of variance," which is a special case of the 	 I ,
analysis of variation, based on a theory of randomness of natural events. 	 f.
In areas like housing and income taxes, the technology becomes one of
politics and law. We see a new dimension in the'Lockean community, which
11
in effect creates disagreements in order to attain a higher level of
agreement.
But has the partitioning rule gained us anything? Here again the
answer to this strategic question depends on a whole system judgment.
In its simplest form, the assumption says that if two contrary hypotheses
are bath consistent with a set of adjusted readings at a specified level
c::' refinement, then there exists some higher level where one (or both)
will fail to be consistent. But this simple form is rather deceptive,
since it does not take into account the tremendous resilience of general
hypotheses about the natural world, nor the strong relationship between
hypotheses and readings. Indeed, when the inquiring system decides that
a hypothesis is not consistent with a set of readings, it may adopt one
of the following policies: (a) revise the hypothesis by adding new
variables, or changing the functional form of the hypothesis, (b) revise
the procedure of adjusting the readings (including discarding one or more
of them as being incorrectly obtained), or (c) tolerate the inconsistency
	
5
until more evidence is available. Hence the role that partitioning plays
is to bring the inquiring system to a stage where it must decide between
these alternatives the me-re sophisticated assumption being that refinementP	 P	 g
of readings will eventually produce this stage.
6. Kant's Problem: Design the Process of Revision
We can now appreciate the most subtle and difficult design problem
of Singerian inquiring systems, which, in honor of its originator, might
be called Kant's problem. It is the problem of revision of the a priori
(Kant) or Weltanschauung (Hegel) or natural image (Singer): when and how
to revise. The design problem depends on the response to the teleological 	 ,•
question, why revise, which in turn depends on the purpose and measure of
performance of the system.
y
1
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Actualiy, Kant's design problem goes back to the Leibnizian and
Lockean inquirers as well. Leibnizian inquirers permit a kind of
competition among world views, or fact nets, so that the design, of when
and how to revise becomes a consideration of the relative weight of each
competitor. In Lockean systems, the design idea is to create a community
of reasonable men, whose agreements become the basis of when and how, and
even why. The community seems to work best when it does not make explicit
the grounds of its agreements. But Kant and Hegel try to make the
Inquirer self—conaciouss. 	 Y.ant Arguers thrtt the- (.-omrnur ► 11,y rshrtrf-s n. votrimr ► s ►
a pr i. on mode of shaping and interpreting sensory responses (time,  H i- ►etce ,
causality, etc.). Implicit in Kant's argument is the question whether
the shape imposed on the data is appropriate. Once we pass beyond Kant's
own reply (there is only one way to shape the data), we are in the land
of the strategy of design with no clear guideposts. Hegel's design
suggestion is just the opposite of Locke's: whenever the community builds
up a strong agreement in a Weltanschauung, then create the counter-
Weltanschauung. What Hegel leaves unanswered is the question whether
such a procedure of disagreement gets us anywhere.
With Singer, the design problem necc es much more explicit than with
any of his contemporaries. Most philosophers of science of Singer's time
were devoting their energies to a "logical reconstruction" of science,
using the new and very powerful tool of symbolic Yogic. In the language
of this essay, they were trying to determine how science has been designed.
They were wise enough to see that science is not what scientists do,
because scientists, being human, are often foolish and perverse even when
they are "doing science." Rather, the logical reconstructionists believed
that they could cull the essence of the scientific method by sorting out
the inconsistencies and-confusions through logical analysis. Thus they
X
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believed that there has been a oasic design of science, and that the
design structure can be ercavaced by removing all the rubble. The success
of the logician in revealing the design structure of mathematics probably
gave considerable reinforcement to their conviction. But the logical
analysis of mathematics at best revealed only the design features of
proof, and not of discovery, i.e., revealed how problems ought to be
solved, given the conditions, rather than what problems ought to be
solved. In systems language, the logicians learned something about the
tactics of mathematics, but comparatively little about its strategy. In
the area of empirical science, the venture was successful at the tactical
level if one could assume a warranted data base, i.e., a set of atomic
assertions about the natural world which are unassailable. Since it is
almost always strategically unsound ever to design an :inquirer which
commits itself strongly to accepting a data base, the tactics of logical
reconstructionism have very limited applicaticn. The strategic error of
logical reconstructionism, for Singer, lies in its attempt to reconstruct
the inquiring system by the use of only one discipline of inquiry, logic.
Singer, on the other hand, saw the necessity of using the whole scope of
inquiry to aid in the design task. As we shall see in the remainder of
this essay, the definition of "whole scope of inquiry" is itself a difficult
and elusive problem, but it is almost certain that the whole scope is
not limited to any one discipline, or, indeed, to all the disciplines as
they are recognized today..
To pursue the underlying ideas of Singer's design, we should explore
at greater length his design idea of "adjusting" readings by returning to
the four simple relationships between the measuring rod and the object
measured. Suppose the measuring system adopts a natural image in accordance
with the first type of assumption, namely, that the measuring rod and the
r
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object-to-be-measured
  remain invariant. But suppose,ppose, also, that the
x
readings are judged to be significantly different. At this point, the
measuring system is faced with a strategic problem, as we have noted.
Suppose it chooses to change the image to option (2), that the rod remains
invariant but the object changes. In doing so, the measuring system must
`.	 create an image which stipulates how the object changes with time or some
other measurable variable. The situation is a common cne in industrial
quality control; to test a lot of bullets, for example, one takes a
sample, fires them through a "standard" barrel, and takes readings of the
velocity. However, the object being measured (bullet velocity at the end
`i
k
of the barrel) changes over time, or, more precisely, with the number of
bullets tested; the decline in velocity can be taken as linear by the
measuring system. Once the coefficients r,x linearity are estimated, the
measuring system is in a position to estimate, for each reading, what
velocity would have been obtained had that reading occurred on the first
trial, when the barrel was brand new. Thus the measuring system is able
to take the ith reading and "adjust" it back to the first reading. In
other words, the measuring system has been able to adjust condition (2)
(changing object) to condition (1) (invariant object) by adjusting the
imagery.
At this point, those who hold precision and certainty as high values
of the inquiring system may feel that the whole foundation has slipped.
Once the measuring system engages in the game of adjusting imagery, and
hence data, to "save" its view of the world, all fundamental control
seems to be lost: there is no ultimate court of appeals. One has only
to recall the very flexible and subtle strategies open to the Ptolemaic
geocentric theory to see how far this game can be extended.
But such a reaction arises out of the kind of parsimony that uo
15
longer is suitable as a criterion for the design of inquiring systems.
The parsimony arises out of a desire for authority or authorization in
design. The word "authority" derives from the concept of leadership, a
component of the system to which one can turn when in doubt. It is
similar to the concept of control, which implies that a component can
observe and correct the behavior of the system. But Singerian inquiring
systems have no such component. Put otherwise, authority and control are
pervasive throughout the system and have no location; the system is
controlled, but no component is the controller. The idea has already
been mentioned several times, under the labels "tactics" and "strategies";
a tactical decision assumes an authority, while a strategic decision does
not. Thus a Singerian inquiring system must bring in the whole breadth
	
_..^
of inquiry in its attempt to authorize and control its procedures.
T. Revision Opportunities: The "Sweeping In" Process
Singer describes one such process, which he labels a "sweeping in"
operation. In the example cited above, where the object changes, the
measurer can "sweep in" variables and their laws which enable him to
adjust his readings. One sees that it would be very helpful if the
inquiring system had a catalogue of opportunities in this regard, and
that the traditional problem of the classification of the sciences might
provide some clues. Singer's method follows &. traditional one of starting
with logic and noting the dimensions added by each science in turn. Thus
arithmetic adds number and numerical laws; geometry adds point, line,
plane, etc., and the laws of space; kinematics adds, time and pure
kinematical laws; mechanics adds mass and mechanical laws; physics adds
groups and fields and statistical laws ("randomness"); biology adds
function, organism and purpose and teleological laws; psychology adds
mind and psychic laws; sociology adds groups of minds and group laws;
	 -^^
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ethics adds ultimate purpose and moral laws.
i	 The sweeping in process consists of bringing concepts and variables
of this catalogue into the model to overcome inconsistencies of the
readings. Thus, in the examples cited above, temperature and barrel wear,
4	 both physical variables,were incorporated into the measuring system's
image of nature. In the nineteenth century, Bessel was able to account
for discrepancies by sweeping in the reaction-time of observers, a
psychological variable. We see again that Singer's design idea is one
more way of building Leibnizian fact nets, and that one may view the
history of the design of inquiring systems as the elaboration of the basic
design features of the Leibnizian inquirer.
The construction of this catalogue of opportunities is a very
difficult design task, as can be seen in the literature dealing with the
topic. Some logicians dispute the contention that arithmetic "adds"
anything new; relativists argue whether kinematics is separable from
geometry; in quantum mechanics, statistical laws are taken to be basic
(so that mechanics and physics are not separable in the catalogue);
molecular biology struggles with the problem of teleological and
deterministic laws for biology, while computer sciences cheerfully use
teleology (e.g., in problem solving) to describe the behavior of machines.
Of course, a great deal of the dispute depends on what one means by
"adding" a new dimenaion. Here Singer himself seems to be confused,
because sometimes he regards the new dimension, e.g., number. to be a
primitive (not definable, say, by the concepts of logic), while sometimes
he regards it to be definable (e.g., he defines purpose and life in terms
of physical concepts).
Nor is it clear what the progression of the sciences means from a
design point of view. v One might say that the inquiring system should
17
explore as low as possible in the progression before going to a science
at a "later" stage. But such a strategy would be foolish. For example,
it is well known that one reason why inconsistent readings are obtained
between laboratories following the same measurement procedures is the
different training of the observers. It would be foolish to explore
physical variables to account for the inconsistency when this more or
less obvious socio-psychological variable is available. Furthermore,
there is no sound reason why the inquiring system should "start" with
logic. To be sure, all inquiry uses logic, but then, as we have seen,
all inquiry uses every branch of inquiry. Logic itself can be regarded
as a derivation of social communication, i.e., as a branch of sociology.
Sometimes the catalogue of inquiring system concepts is likened to
a lattice framework of interconnected concepts, but this analogy only
weakly portrays the depths of the problem. The complexity of the
interconceptual design is better illustrated in that episode in physics
when wave and particle imagery were recognized as legitimate dual
Weltanschauungen. To be fanciful, the catalogue program calls for
interpreting chemistry as a teleological science (so that, .or example,
the fragmentation of the sample in Chapter 0 is an attempt to minimize
some variable of the system); or calls for interpreting physical particles
as living things; or calls for conceiving all scientific laws as moral
lave; and so on. All of the recent hue and cry for "interdisciplinary
research" by foundations and other supporters of science might be regarded
as a response to the collective unconscious realization that human
knowledge does not come in pieces: to understand an aspect of nature ?.s
i	 1
to see it through "all" the .rays of imagery.
	 ,
8. The StratM of Agreement Revisited
We can begin to sense the endless process of the Singerian inquiring
-^ ^	 r
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system. This feature of its design can be emphasized if we examine
further the strategy of agreement. We have already seen one departure
from the terminating strategy of the Lockean inquirer, when all the
readings are alike. The argument was that an increasing number of like
readings did not increase the system's confidence in an hypothesis,
because there exist counter-hypotheses which are also in agreement with
the readings. This argument extends to the case where the readings differ,
but the differences are judged to be satisfactory. At such a stage, the
strategic question is whether or not the system should seek a counter-
hypothesis. The spirit of the HegeV.an
 inquiring system on which Singer
built his theory of inquiry says that when all is going well, and data
and hypothesis are mutually compatible, then is the time to rock the boat,
upset the apple cart, encourage revolution and dissent. Professors with
well established theories should encourage their students to attack them
with equally plausible counter-theories. This is the only pathway to
reality: whenever we are confident that we have grasped reality, then
begins the new adventure to reveal our illusion and put us back again in
the black forest.
But the process is dialectical, which means that two opposing
processes are at work in the inquiring system. One is the process of
defending the status quo, the existing
 "paradigm" of inquiry, with its
established methods, data and theory. The other is the process of
attacking the status quo, proposing radical but forceful paradigms,
questioning the quality of the status quo.
Singer in the quotation at the end of Chapter 0 called the "real"
an "ideal," and we can see why. The idealist is a restless fellow who
sees evil in complacency; he regards the realist as a hypocrite at times,
because his realism is unrealistic. The realist,.on the other hand,
/!
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accuses the idealist of being impractical, because his insistence on
destroying the value of the present way of life precludes positive action.
The Singerian inquiring system does not seek to resolve the philosophical
dispute, but, on the contrary, seeks to intensify it.2
9. The Teleology of Inquiry
Singer made the theme of endless process a central one in his
philosophy; his name for the restlessness he has in mind is "contentment.0
What appear to be opposites, the restless and the contented, become the
opposite sides of the same idea, when we realize that "contentment" comes
from the Latin "continere," to "hold together." The contented life is
the complete life, made up of all those aspects of a life that make it
meaningful. But to be restful is to establish oneself in only one sector
of a life, and to ignore the rest. So to be it
	 is to be restless.
But "restless" does not really capture the essence of Singer's idea,
because it too often connotes pointless, whereas the Singerian inquiring
system is above all teleological, a grand teleology with an ethi^al base.
If we use the scheme on page 00, the following i;naracteristics emerge:
1. The inquiring system has the purpose of creating knowledge, which
means creating the capability of choosing the right means for one's
desired ends.
2. The measure of performance is to be defined as the "level" of
scientific and educational excellence of all society, a measure yet to be
2I tried to portray the draw of the dispute in Chapter 14 of
Challenge to Reason, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968.
3See his On the Contented Life, New York: Henry Holt S Company,
1936.
developed.4
3. The client is mankind, i.e., all human teleological beings.
4. The components have been the disciplines, but the design of
A
inquiry along esoteric, disciplinary lines is probably wrong, as we have
s
a	 seen, if the purpose is "exoteric" knowledge, i.e., knowledge that goes
I	 outward to be useful for all men in all societies.
5. The environment of the inquiring system is a very critical
aspect of the design. Singer's theory of value is essentially "enabling."
That is, ethical values are based on an assessment of man's capability of
attaining what he wants, and not an assessment of the goals as such.
Thus the ethical system apparently passes no judgment on t'-e quality of a
man's life. But this appearance is deceptive, because one man may want
to deprive another of his life or liberty. Hence the environment which
the inquiring system critically needs is a cooperative environment, where
A wants that goal which will aid B in attaining his goals. One sees how
fuzzy the boundaries of the inquiring system become, because inquiry is
evidently needed to create cooperatio., and cooperation to create inquiry.
This is why the design of a Singerian
	
Aring system eventually becomes
the design of the whole social system.
6. The decision makers are everyone--in the ideal. But at any
stage, there will be the leadere and the followers. For Singer, the most
important decision makers are the heroes, those inspired by the heroic
mood to depart from the safe lands of the status quo. Nor-- needs to be
said about these men and their moods when we assess the inquiring system
4Singer used to speculate on the suitability of using the standard
deviation of a physical constant (e.g., the velocity of light in v_)
as a surrogate measure. But this speculation was made in an are where
physical science was held in high regard, and I-; was not naive to expect
that the findings of the scientists would be published and aid all men
In the pursuit of their goals.
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vis-a-vis the concept of progress.
7-8. The designers are everyone--in the ideal. Progress can be
measured in terms of the degree to which the client, decision maker, and
designer are the same. This stipulation may seem odd it one regard, at
least. If the client is all mankind, then how can those who have died
be served by the living system? Worse still, since the ideal is never
attained, the system must inevitably fail to serve all cients. But the
thesis that once a man has died he can no longer be served is not a
tautology, and indeed may be challenged by the counter Weltanschauung
that all. men are immortal in terms of being clients. It is not even
necessary to postulate individual immortality. To worship one's ancestors
I
may simply be the act of regarding their life intentions as sacred as our
own and our progeny.
9. I ':cave purposefully stressed the theme of betterment in the
foregoing account, even to the point of a kind of simplistic optimism.
It is doubtful whether Singer himself would have so strongly expressed
his hopes for mankind. The counter-argument is most strongly reinforced
when we ask for the nature of the inbuilt guarantor which gives sense to
the optimism.
10. Science and Imperatives: The "Is" and the "Ought„
The fact that the Singerian inquiring system has no real terminating
point on any issue brings out some interesting features of its language.
The language of such an inquiring system needs to convey both what has
been learned and what has not been learned. In a language like English
the indicative mood of expression ("This apple is green") is reasor ­_^^ly
capable of expressing what has been learned, but is very poorly designed
to express the unlearned. Singer suggested, instead, that the language
of the inquiring system requires a departure fraa the form . "X is P" as
ion
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regards all three of its parts: subject, verb and predicate. To express
the uncertainties of the finding, one needs to convey the idea that the
subject in the inquiring system's finding may not be the real s ubject
which a specific question about nature has raised. The predicate should
'	 somehow express the latitude of uncertainty about the descriptor, e.g.,
by conveying some range of possible values. Finally, the verb should
convey the information thct the finding is a judgment of a Lockean
community, based on its self-imposed rules.
In place of "X is P," Singer therefore suggests something like "The
object observed is to be taken as having property P plus or minus E."
The "is to be taken" is a self-imposed imperative of the community.
Taken in the ccntext of the whole Singerian theory of inquiry and progress,
the imperative has the status of an ethical judgment. That is, the
community judges that to accept its instruction is to bring about a
suitable tactic or strategy in the grand teleological scheme. The
acceptance may lead to social actions outside of inquiry, or to new kinds
of inquiry, or whatever. Part of the community's judgment is concerned
with the appropriateness'of,these actions from an ethical point of view.
Hence, the linguistic puzzle which bothered some empiricists as to how
the inquiring system can pass linguistically from "is" statements to
"ought" statements is no puzzle at all in the Singerian inquirer: the
inquiring system speaks exclusively in the "ought," the "is" being only
a convenient facyon de parler when one wants to block out uncertainty in
the discourse. As a computer programmer would say, the whole design is
r	 i
instructions, including the "data base."
11. Progress or Process? The Heroic Mood
Singer's theory of progress is far more subtle than the theory of
t^	 "linear progress" which eras popular in the nineteenth century. To
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understand it, one needs to adopt a dialectical point of view. On one
side, call it the light side, is production-science-cooperation, the
trilogy of nineteenth century optimism. The progress towards this trilogy
is towards a world of enlightenment, where men have the means to live out
their individual lives in their own unique ways, without having to disrupt
the lives of others, or, more strongly, with the natural urge to help
others to enrich their lives. But the lessons of history tell us that
when production and science begin to dominate, then society becomes
fragmented; only some men reap the benefits and do so by exploiting the
environment and their fellow man.
"Oh," says the scientist, "then we must use our science to see how
we can get men to cooperate more, to reduce population growth rates,
air-water pollution, labor exploitation. The measure of progress must
include cooperation, which cannot be separated from production-science.
Refining our measures and producing more effective machines is not
progress if thereby more conflict occurs. In other words, progress is
not linear, but a very complicated non-linear releLtionship between the
enabling forces of production, science, and cooperation."
This is all very well, but one cannot help noting who is speaking:
the scientist. He wants to make science, i.e., the inquiring system, the
leading edge of progress, because for him there can be no progress without
understanding. Even if we grant him his premise that science has created
more and more knowledge, why should we also grant him his other premise
that the net benefit has been positive? Why not simply say that making
knowledge is like any other form of life: it happens and it is neither
good nor bad. You make knowledge, he makes love; you both simply live
out an existence.
To Singer, such a charge to-the scientific cemmunit; is based, not
J
a
24
on so-called scientific evidence, but on a "mood," a complex of emotions
which arise out of man's ancestry.
Had Singer written later, he could heva used the wealth of material
which Jung and his followers have collected to illustrate the force of
the "collective unconscious" on the human psyche. Singer found his clue
in but one albeit important aspect of this force, the heroic mood.
Joseph Campbell has well described the structure of the mood in his Hero_
with a Thousand Faces. 5 The myths of the hero, he says, begin with some
i
stable state of affairs, a comfortable house, beautiful wife and children,
high respect, in short, plenty of production-science-cooperation. Therr.
comes the impulse for the adventure or quest, sometimes in the form of a
message from the gods, or other heroes, but in any event the hero has no
choice but to go forth, to leave the comforts for a kind of cold darkness.
Beasts and evil spirits keep challenging him in the dark forest. In our
drama, the black forest and its challengers are the mood that progress
does not exist, only a process at best, that the enterprise is no
enterprise at all. For the hero in the midst of his journey has no
assurance that anything will happen except his own death and that of his
companions. At this stage, the idea of progress and fulfillment seem
very foolish indeed. The stage need not be tragic or ominous, of course;
it may be humorous, playful, silly, lovely. Then science and its great
big serious program of knowledge, control of Nature, and the rest looks
utterly ridiculous: fat science proclaiming it will save the world while
it odoriferously defecates in public.6
5New York: Meridian Books, 1956.
6P'or the contrast, see James Hillman "Se_n^e
..
x and P,.uer: An Aspect of
the Historical and Psychological Present, Offprint from Brawe-Jehrbuc_h,
XXXVI/1967, Zurich: Rhein-Vierlag, 1968.
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But then the hero--or some heroes at least--arrive at their goal,
fight the ultimate battle and win. As in the case of the Buddha, the
battle may be a spiritual one, or for our inquirer, an intellectual one.
But this is not all; the hero must return, and there is usually much to
tempt him to stay and not bring back the fruits of his labors, just as
Newton hid many of his important discoveries in his study. For the
journey back means leaving the heights of heroism for the mundane, boring,
everyday existence. Furthermore, the trip back is usually another black
forest and its challengers, but this time the other side of the forest is
dullness.
It is very important to note that the hero's journey is not restricted
to great men-to semi-gods. The hero is in every one of us, and it is
r
impossible to say whether a Newton or Theseus is a greater hero than the
individual who risks his security in the quest for self-knowledge. To be
sure, the `heroic mood is often suppressed by other emotions and thoughts;
to free it in every man is an ideal, the ideal of a unified decision-maker,
client and designer.
But what about the question: is there progress or merely process?
Which is the same as the thematic question of this essay: does the
inquiring system generate knowledge of reality or its own form of illusion?
The response is: it depends on where you are. If you are at home,
in the status quo, there is a kind of quiet progress, an orderliness,
cleanness, comfort, in which little discoveries here and there push back
the decimal places and provide better ways of doing things. If you are
on the road, then there is no progress, just change, which can be bright
or dark, funny or sad, tragic or comic. The rules are gone, laws make no
sense. If you are fighting the battle, or whatever the mission may be,
you are risking your soul for something overwhelmingly important and
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central. Progress is no longer diffuse, but here and now in your actions;
revolution is one word for it. If you are on the way back, you may be
disillusioned, angry, dead in spirit, or playful, or senile.
12. The Guarantor
Can we design the heroic mood? Jung, in his The Undiscovered Self,
tells us about two views of the human psyche. In the one, ratan is counted
and classified. The wonder is the diversity, but out of the diversity
comes the need to lead, to pass regulations which tell us which classes
of people can do what, regulations which become the State. The other
world view is the unique individual and his relation-to something more
wondrous than himself. One might be tempted to say that design belongs
I L 1	 only to the first view of the human being, but this would be much too
hasty a judgment. The hero's quest, which is universal across mankind,
is one example of a unique relationship of an individual to his God; it
cannot be "designed" by any of the typical methods of design which we
have discussed thus far. But design is very young, practically a baby.
What would design have to be like for us to be able to design a unique
individual's relationship to his God, or to design an heroic mood?
We have come by a long route back to the issues of Chapter I. where
we placed design and creativity together to examine their similarities
and differences. The entire excursion could be regarded as a search for
more understanding of these two dialectical concepts; the question remains
the same in kind but is a book long in its asking: can design grasp the
essence of the creative in each one of us?
I don't know any sensible response to this question, although I
think the question itself is sensible. I could try the head-on approach
of defining the illusive concepts that have crept into the Singerian
design while I wasn't watching: hero, mood, tragedy, comedy, unique and
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Cod, among others. Then I'd define design, and there we'd be. At least
we'd be moving, processing. But my mood suggests another kind of
adventure. Very often, I've found, in the tales, the hero spends an
incredible amount of time just wandering around, apparently getting
nowhere, or worse, being blown farther away from his quest. The approach
is circumambulatory, a marvelously long word for a confusion. So in the
remainder of this essay I'll walk around the issue of a meaning of design
which could encompass the heroic mood and other aspects of the creative.
